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Abstract 
In his lecture of 14th March 1979, within the series, The Birth of the Biopolitical, Michel 
Foucault discusses in some depth the American form of neo-liberalism, contrasting it with 
the development of neo-liberalism in Germany before and during World War Two. With 
respect to the radical approaches to neo-liberalism of Theodore Schulz and Gary Becker, 
Foucault offers a succinct shorthand understanding of the notion of self as human capital 
within neo-liberal economic rationality. This self is an “ability-machine” and an “income-
stream” or “flow.” The English translator of The Birth of the Biopolitical, Graham Burchell, 
offers a curious footnote on this succinct abbreviation, machine/flow: “The word “machine” 
seems to be Foucault’s, an allusion or wink to L’Anti-Oedipe of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari”.  Indeed the machine/flow couple is a crucial territorializing and de-
territorialising ensemble of relations for Deleuze and Guattari in both volumes of Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia. That “wink” to D & G, suggested by Burchell, opens the space for a 
compelling engagement with an ongoing understanding of Foucault’s critical philosophical 
writings and Deleuze’s own work. But here we are afforded an opportunity to engage the 
extent to which the machinic/flows ensemble in Deleuze and Guattari, or their political 
concerns with capitalism, are an allied diagnostic to Foucault’s writings on the 
governmentality of neo-liberalism, particularly in relation to the radical notions of the 
movement of freedom in a self’s relation to herself, that is opened in an analytics of the 
political rationality of neo-liberalism. This paper approaches an understanding of “territory” 
in relation to the emphasis given by both Deleuze and Foucault to fundamental 
transformations, particularly since the second half of the twentieth century, to sovereign 
juridical understanding of subject-rights, to neo-liberal understandings of entrepreneurial 
self-enterprise as inequity of competition: territory becoming milieu, becoming flow. 
 
 
Machine/Flow/Territory 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari published Anti-Oedipus in 1972 with its short “Preface” by 
Michel Foucault. Foucault had previously written on the work of Deleuze in 1970 with 
“Theatrum Philosophicum,” an extended review of Deleuze’s two books Difference and 
Repetition and Logic of Sense, both published in 1969. And Foucault and Deleuze engaged in a 
recorded conversation, transcribed and published in 1972 as “Intellectuals and Power.”  It is 
to Anti-Oedipus that I want to turn in this presentation, though in a very specific context that 
asks us, perhaps, to again work through this extraordinary text according to a regime of 
reading at once heterogeneous to the desiring production now normalized within the 
circuits of it recording-inscriptions. The context is this: in 1978-79 Foucault delivered his 
Collège de France lecture course, titled The Birth of Biopolitics. He initially revises and 
summarises the content of the previous year Security, Territory, Population, concerned with a 
fundamental transformation in the mid-to-late eighteenth century from disciplinary 
mechanisms to apparatuses of security coincident with the emergence in European States of 
a crisis of sovereignty and governmental agency with the development of modern forms of 
economic order and a governmentality of the State concerned more with the aleatory, with 
the management of risk than with the confinement of populations and definition of territory. 
At stake was no longer a Mercantilism that ordered and confined but a liberalism that 
managed flows. However, for most of this lecture course Foucault discusses the appearance 
in the twentieth century of significant developments or mutations of a liberalism that 
emerged towards the end of the eighteenth century and that he had discussed previously in 
its nineteenth-century developments in terms of bio-politics and State-racism.  
 
There are two moments in the development of twentieth-century neo-liberalism discussed 
by Foucault. One has its emergence in Germany in the early 1930s, coincident with the 
development of National Socialism, and vehemently opposed to the economic order 
developed under Nazism. This is the Freiberg Ordoliberal movement, associated with 
Eucken, Böhm, Müller-Armack and von Hayek. With the second moment, Foucault 
analyses American neo-liberalism, referencing Schultz and particularly the work of Becker 
in the 1970s. I will return to discuss briefly aspects of neo-liberal theory, as my aim is to 
bring into discussion aspects of the work of Becker and the concerns of Deleuze and 
Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, as two moments of a common project that seemed to be emerging 
for Foucault by the end of the 1970s and into the early 1980s. We see that Foucault made 
one of his abrupt changes, after he had completed the 1978-79 course. His lectures in the 
1980s, until his death in 1984 concerned a hermeneutics of the self and a turning of the 
questions developed with respect to the State and Civil society, the governmentality of the 
State to a question of the governmentality of the self. These lectures do not engage the 
contemporaneity of 1970s American economic policy, as did his work at the end of the 70s. 
Rather, they turn to Greek and Roman texts on parrhesia, on the art of truth telling as an 
ethics of existence.  
 
There is something perhaps incomplete in the break Foucault makes between a searching 
questioning of neo-liberalism in contexts of asking how the movements of freedom and 
domination find their new rationalities and normalizations, as well as their new articulations 
of sovereign right. There has been criticism of Foucault’s last work on the care of the self, or 
on the self as a work of art, as so much romantic hubris and abrogation of political 
responsibility. Certainly we did not find Foucault himself bridging these two arenas of 
concern that seem to be destined to such different archival repositories: twentieth-century 
economic reason and Classical Greek or Roman texts on governing oneself. Though I 
suggest that if we look to an important 1982 essay by Foucault we see a curious resonance if 
not direct reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, that perhaps infers an important 
role for that 1972 text to, in a sense, and somewhat after-the-fact intimately engage in just 
how Foucault intended to pursue his far-reaching enquiry into parrhesia and his concerns 
with an analytics of the governmentality of the State. The 1982 essay was written and 
published in English as the “Afterword” to Dreyfus and Rabinow’s Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics. What was that resonance or reference? Have I simply imagined 
it or wished it into existence?  
 
The 1982 essay is titled “Why Study Power: The Question of the Subject.”  Just as in a 
1977 interview when he transformed his concerns from archaeology to genealogy Foucault 
asks what after all was he studying all this time if not power, so here Foucault suggests: “I 
would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of my work during the last twenty years. 
It has not been to analyse the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundation of such 
an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by 
which, in our culture, human beings are made into subjects. … Thus it is not power, but the 
subject, which is the general theme of my research.”  
 
Foucault then goes on to note that the human subject is placed in three essential relations, 
those of production and of signification, and that of power relations which we now 
encounter as the producing of subjects as effects of a freedom of a self as immanent cause of 
power’s relations. While there are disciplinary fields of economics and linguistics to engage 
the first two, there is no theory of power to define the third, outside of juridical legal 
frameworks or institutional models of the State. Foucault then asks: “On what basis would 
we claim that we now need a theory of power, and how would we proceed with its 
conceptualisation?” It is here I want to make my connection with Anti-Oedipus on two 
counts: firstly in relation to this triple register of production, signification and power and, 
secondly, in relation to Foucault’s more detailed engagement with the governmentality of 
the State in the neo-liberal theories of Gary Becker and the resonance with Becker’s human-
capitalist as self-enterprise and the desiring-machines of Anti-Oedipus. 
 
We note in Anti-Oedipus that Deleuze and Guattari determine three characteristics of the 
machine, three modes of functioning, which is to say three modes of its relational 
assembling: production, signification and producing a subject, or connective syntheses, 
disjunctive syntheses and conjunctive syntheses. The first characteristic suggests desiring 
machines slice off and break flows, producing partial objects, producing production; they 
also not just slice off matter to produce things but, as a second characteristic, detach 
heterogeneous chains of signifying material, producing the codes of desire; and there are, 
thirdly, residual breaks, producing subjects alongside the machine, a share that falls to the 
subject as a part of the whole, income coming its way as something left over. The subject is 
a surplus.  
 
Are Deleuze and Guattari using the word ‘machine’ metaphorically? They insist they are 
not. Anti-Oedipus offers a radical encounter with understanding the existent in its existence in 
terms of a turmoil or irreconcilability between two modalities of the existent, as striating 
desiring machine or machines that function to produce flows and cut flows, machines that 
couple with machines ad infinitum. And there is, irreconcilably, the smooth surface of a 
body-without-organs. They suggest: “The body without organs, the unproductive, the 
unconsumable, serves as a surface for the recording of the entire process of production of 
desire” (11). Hence, they suggest, capital is the body-without-organs of the capitalist-being. 
It is matter, continuous flow making the machine responsible for producing a surplus, for 
producing productions, significations and subjects. Anti-Oedipus attacks all of the doxas 
concerning Marx and Freud, and a few others, such that from the formation of an 
individuated self to the formation of the State, we have to negotiate the triangulated and 
unassailable institutions of the Oedipal family (daddy, mommy and child) and Capital 
(relations of production, forces of production, means of production or capitalist, labour time 
and surplus value). At once, Anti-Oedipus invents another ontology of the self in relation to 
individuation and totalization. The self is a singular multiplicity. We already have 
encountered Foucault discussing such a notion in Theatrum Philosophicum, with his modal 
doubling of the phantasm and the event. Indebted to Klossowski and Blanchot in this 
engagement, Foucault suggests that the two series of phantasm and event are brought into 
resonance. They do not converge into a phantasmatic event, just as desiring machines and 
bodies without organs do not constitute a unity but a univocity—a being recognised as 
difference without any difference in the form of its expression. Thinking requires the release 
of the phantasm in the mime producing it, making the event indefinite so as to repeat itself 
as a singular universal. The phantasm constitutes the object of thought; the event is thought 
itself. Opposed to the event is knowing, which aims to determine the event on the basis of a 
concept. Opposed to the phantasm is judging which measures the phantasm against reality 
by searching for its origin. We would want to recognise in the modal capacities of desiring 
machines something of the producing apparatus of phantasms and with the body-without-
organs something of the recording surface of an event. On the side of desiring 
machines/phantasms is the objet a, of Lacan, object cause of desire, immanent to the 
production capabilities of the material products of partial objects, but also a knowledge 
about which the subject knows nothing, unconscious knowledge of the heterogeneous 
signifying chains, so many detachments of desiring codes, and the surplus income in 
production constituting the phantasmatic subject. On the side of the event/body-without-
organs are the drives, without aim, constituting a peculiar understanding of truth-event as 
pure difference. Between knowledge and truth, between the symptom and the drive there is 
no relation. 
 
In his lecture of 21 March, 1979, Foucault discusses in some detail the neo-liberal economic 
theory of Gary Becker. Both Becker and Theodore Schultz published at about the same 
time (1971) significant works on the economic theory of human labour, more or less 
developing the notion of human capital as human resource. In brief, neo-liberalism radically 
reconsiders Classical economic theory, which has three fundamental elements, land, capital 
and labour. The reconsideration focuses on a fundamental understanding of what 
constitutes labour in economic terms. Labour was either ignored or, for Marx, it was 
converted to labour time. That is to say, labour was abstracted. Neo-liberal economics 
begins with the concretization of labour, as a real product of capitalism: “The fundamental, 
essential problem, anyway the first problem which arises when one wants to analyse labour 
in economic terms, is how the person who works uses the means available to him. … we will 
have to study work as economic conduct practiced, implemented, rationalized, and 
calculated by the person who works.” The worker is not an abstracted object with respect to 
supply and demand but “an active economic subject.”  
 
In this sense, wages, as income, are now considered as return on capital investment, where 
that capital is one’s own capacities but also the source for future income. Hence this capital-
self is something that needs to be invested in as well, in order to accrue a greater return on 
capital. The self is a set of abilities, a skill, a “machine,” as well as an “earning stream”: “We 
should therefore view the whole as a machine/stream complex … at the opposite extreme 
of a conception of labour power sold at the market price to capital invested in an enterprise.” 
Rather, each individual self is its own enterprise, its own self-enterprise. Economies are 
ensembles of enterprise-units. This is somewhat different to Classical economics 
understanding of economic-man, as that equal partner in exchange. With neo-liberalism, 
homo oeconomicus is an entrepreneur of herself. Human capital is an assemblage of innate 
elements, hereditary, and what can be called educational investments, “investments that 
form an abilities-machine”:  
This means that we thus arrive at a whole environmental analysis, as the Americans 
say, of the child’s life which it will be possible to calculate, and to a certain extent 
quantify, or at any rate measure, in terms of possibilities of investment in human 
capital. … In the same way, we can analyse medical care and, generally speaking, 
all activities concerning the health of individuals, which will thus appear as so many 
elements which enable us, first, to improve human capital, and second, to preserve 
and employ it for as long as possible. Thus, all the problems of health care and 
public hygiene must, or at any rate, can be rethought as elements which may or 
may not improve human capital. (229-230) 
  
We recognise this “abilities-machine” and income-stream constitutes the human more so as 
a desiring-machine that breaks the flows of capital’s body-without-organs, so many 
productions as partial objects, so many signifying chains determining the heterogeneity of 
the codes of desire whose surplus is a self’s relation to itself.  In his 1982 essay on the subject 
and power, where Foucault presents the triple register of production, signification and 
subject, he also introduces something new in his thinking developed in his lectures on 
governmentality and neo-liberalism—an essential freedom that necessarily precedes an 
exercise of power: “A power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two 
elements which are indispensible if it is really to be a power relationship: that “the other” 
(the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the 
very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of 
responses, reactions, results, and possible interventions may open up.” Such recognition of a 
preemptory freedom-to-act does not exclude either violence or consent as modalities by 
which relations of force are engaged, separately or in unison. Though crucially, the exercise-
of-power itself is constituted in neither violence nor consent, but via action on the actions of 
others: “Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only so far as they are free.” Hence 
power and freedom are not in confrontation, are not directly opposed.  
 
Freedom is not the elimination of power but rather its supposition, its point of articulation 
and possibility. Freedom is in this sense power’s immanent cause, recognised by power’s 
effects. Power relations are not a phenomenon to be encountered in addition to the 
formation of social relations or a social nexus. They constitute, in their diffuse and capillary 
circulations, the very relationality of the social. But how do we understand this “subject” 
whose freedom is an immanent cause to any relations of force? And how is such thinking 
not seemingly utopic in the context of the kind of capillary-like flows of the self as enterprise 
we saw in the work of Becker? Foucault recognised the radicality of neo-liberalism in the 
manner whereby it demanded that a self determine a relation with itself, constituting an 
ethico-political imperative that asks not so much what we are but how me might resist what 
we are. It is, perhaps, the very formulations by Deleuze and Guattari that precisely 
approach the self as an abilities machine and income stream but a self whose formation is 
constituted in an essential freedom that at all points enables a capacity to become other than 
what one is. The very relations of desiring machines to the inscription surfaces of bodies 
without organs antagonize the territorialising institutions of Oedipus and the State. 
